Research

I use formal and computational models to unpack how moments of contentious politics actually work. That means studying protest, repression, concessions, and the strategic interactions among activists, governments, and the broader public that drive them.

Publications

How Does Violence Deter? Functional and Informational Effects of Preemptive Repression (Published at the Journal of Peace Research)

Abstract

Research on the relationship between repression and dissent has mostly ignored the mechanisms through which repression affects dissent. I distinguish two distinct channels through which repression can deter dissidents. First, preemptive repression works through a functional channel by directly reducing the opposition's capabilities. Second, the severity of preemptive repression provides information to its target about the strength of government. I use a formal model to demonstrate how these two channels interact, leading to strategic behavior that has not been discussed in previous work. In particular, I show that the functional and informational channels are not necessarily complementary. The model demonstrates that uncertainty about government resolve can both increase or decrease observed repression. It also shows that repression can become more effective in deterring dissent when it is more costly and vice versa. Taken together, these results provide a theoretical explanation for the inconsistent empirical findings on the effect of repression on dissent and offer a framework for future research.

Working Papers

Repression as a screening tool: Strategic Restraint and the Punishment Puzzle (Under Review)

Abstract

Governments routinely use repression against protests only to follow it with accommodation afterward. Existing theories do not adequately explain why governments persist in using repression despite its seemingly ambiguous or counterproductive effects. I argue that repression can serve a screening function. Using a formal model, I demonstrate that even capable governments deliberately set repression below the level that would deter activists they prefer to accommodate, using repression instead to screen out less aggrieved groups. Two key comparative statics follow. As mobilization costs fall, repression indirectly becomes cheaper and the likelihood of successful protest declines. As repression becomes cheaper, governments repress more but to less effect, and observed success of protest increases. In addition to providing an explanation for the punishment puzzle, the results also provide an explanation for inconsistent findings on the effect of repression on protests.

Ignoring or Responding to Protests (Working Paper)

Abstract

Ignoring is the most common government response to protests across the globe. Yet the literature on contentious politics overwhelmingly assumes that governments must respond to popular mobilizations with repression or accommodation. I model an environment, where activists cannot coerce the government to make concessions. Activists use public mobilization to signal grievances to the government and the general public. The model shows small protests can risk exposing an incumbent government's lack of interest in the citizens' welfare and push them to make concessions in order to retain support. The model also specifies when a government will ignore large number of protesters.